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A survey of the range of methodologies from the purely
quantitative methods such as systems analysis, operations
analysis, and operations research toward methods which
incorporate other information, such as trend extrapolation,
economic analysis (as it pertains to defense) and the Delphi
Technique. A brief introduction to the utility of scenario
construction precedes an examination of the wargame ; both
useful in many ways to the military planner. This is an
attempt to illustrate the quality and worth of the quantita-
tive methods, as well as point out the need for the open
mind when considering defense matters. Proven methodolo-
gies, the scientific method, and alternative courses must
all be utilized in the technological war.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. PROBLEM DEFINITION
For twenty- five years now the United States Department
of Defense has been firmly in the grip of the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System, systems analysis, cost-
benefit analysis, and the concept of sufficiency. Systems
analysis has become confused with strategic analysis. The
natural tendency has been to approach all problems as quan-
tifyable ones; attempt to structure the analysis in a
numerical manner, and make a decision from the balance
sheet. The result is that decisions are not made in rela-
tion to a coherent strategy, but rather merely as reactions
to individual analysis on an ad-hoc basis.
All of the empirical methods of research are valuable
aids to the decision-maker, however, they cannot make the
decision for him. The information garnered through research
methods must be assimilated into a coherent strategy and at
present no reliable mechanism exists for accomplishing that
goal.
In the open, pluralistic political system of the United
States, administrative changes are frequent. In this type
of environment long range policy planning is difficult at
best. Defense planning, despite shifts in the civilian
leadership, must be geared to a strategy of positive goals
and objectives designed to provide for national security
into the next century. Ideally, such a strategy would be
integrated throughout the services and coordinated with
stated national political objectives. It would also be
flexible enough to deal with the uncertainties inherent in
the budgetary process.
Both the Army and the Navy have commissioned studies of
long range strategic planning for the military. The Army
study will be addressed in Chapter Three. The Navy experi-
ment, concerned with the shifting trends in the maritime
balance, was designed to test the utility of adopting the
strategic planning methods of business to naval planning.
The concept of a corporate strategy is the pattern of deci-
sions in a company that :
^
1. Both shapes and reveals the company's objectives and
goals
.
2. Develops the principal policies and plans for
fulfilling these purposes.
3. Defines the business the company intends to be in and
the kind of economic and human organization it
intends to be.
4. Manages the allocation of limited resources to the
achievement of limited objectives.
The decisions that contribute to this corporate strategy
must be effective over long periods, affect the company in
many different ways, and commit a significant portion of the
company's resources toward accomplishing the desired
purposes. The pattern resulting from a series of such deci-
sions defines the central character and image of the
company. In addition, the pattern permits specification of
objectives. These are to be obtained through a timed
sequence of decisions about investment and execution. The
pattern governs directly the deployment or redeployment of
resources to make these decisions effective.
Several major problems arise whenever an attempt is made
to provide for long term planning needs . First is the
problem of uncertainty. Uncertainty exists at all levels of
'CAPT R.G. Tolg, Jr., USN , et . al
.
, "The Maritime
Balance Study. The Navy Strategic Planning Experiment"
(Washington, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 15
April, 1979) p. 3.
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the problem of the future. The environment, resource allo-
cation, potential opponents goals and objectives all must be
considered, along with a myriad of other things. Another
problem is that of implementation. With planning for the
most part dropped out of the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System, long term goals and objectives are unclear
at best. Another problem, which relates directly to the
adoption of a corporate strategy, is the lack of a measure
of utility for resources allocated and options foregone.
B. OBJECTIVES OF STUDY
The backlash of the Vietnam War has been an assault on
the rational empirical methodologies under which the
Department of Defense has operated since World War II. The
problems and pitfalls of these methods were pointed out very
dramatically during the mid 1970 's when The United States
efforts in Southeast Asia collapsed. Since that time a
cynical attitude has developed about the quantitative
methods. Although they did not provide all the answers as
advertised, they still possess an undisputed merit as deci-
sion tools. As an attempt to avoid the "throwing out the
baby with the bathwater" syndrome, this thesis will examine
objectively various methodological techniques, recognizing
both strong points and intellectual costs of each. These
methodological techniques exist to serve the purposes of
forecasting and planning. Therefore, a good starting point
is a short examination of these areas, what they do, and
what their requirements are. From there the basics of model
building and systems analysis will be examined.
The survey of methodologies will be designed to move
through the purely quantitative methods such as systems
analysis, operations analysis, and operations research
toward the methods which incorporate other information, such
as trend extrapolation, economic analysis (as it applies to
defense) and the Delphi technique. A brief introduction to
the utility of scenario construction precedes an examination
of the war game; useful in many ways to the military
planner.
Chapter Three is an analysis of scenario construction.
Scenario construction in military usage can serve as both a
fundamental step to rational empirical analysis and as a
bridge to the intuitive, the speculative, and the creative.
The next chapter will examine practitioners of scenario
building both in defense and in the works of the popular
mind. In the defense field, think tanks such as the Rand
Corporation, Hudson Institute, and Global 2000 will be
addressed. Three short case studies at the policy, stra-
tegic, and tactical levels of planning will be presented.
Chapter Four will continue with an examination of themes
which re-occur in the popular mind; focusing on possible
applications to strategic planning. Practitioners who also
write in the speculative areas will be presented in order to
tie together the practitioners and popular mind sections of
the chapter.
The conclusion will attempt to illustrate the quality
and worth of the quantitative methods, as well as point out
the need for the open mind when considering defense matters.
Proven methodologies, the scientific method, and alternative
courses must all be utilized in the technological war.
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II. SURVEY OF METHODOLOGICAL TECHNIQUES .
A. PLANNING AND FORECASTING
1'. Planning
Planning can be broken down into three major catego-
ries for the purpose of definitions.
Policy Planning - The formulation of alternative
goal patterns or functional objectives for the future -
based on alternative future environments or scenarios - in a
continuous comparison, selection and feedback process.
Policy planning, being concerned with goals, seldom involves
technological considerations in any central way.
Strategic (or entrepreneurial) Planning -
Formulation of a set of alternative routes or options for
achieving the chosen set of goals , together with a procedure
for systematic comparison and assessment. The result is
sometimes called a decision agenda. Frequently the stra-
tegic options involve significant technological develop-
ments, especially when the goals are related to physical
problems. There may be a large number of ways to achieve
any of the functional objectives.
Tactical (or Operational) Planning - delineating the
sequence of actions necessary to implement a particular
strategy. The technological aspects of tactical planning
would be concerned with reaching well defined technological
(as opposed to functional) objectives generally in terms of
11
specified systems or subsystems,^
Planning consists primarily of making current deci-
sions with an eye toward their futurity. It is the process
of identifying what must be done in the present in order to
enhance the probability of a desired outcome in an uncertain
future. A sample of the items which must be considered are:
1. What futurity must be programmed into present
thinking?
2. What time spans must be considered?
3. How does one maximize the probablity of achieving the
objectives sought, while at the same time minimizing
risk?
Various methods are available to the planner for
assessing the future. A number of these will be addressed
in this chapter. Most deal with studies assessing the
future comparing goals and the methods and means to achieve
them. Capabilities, skills and performance are coupled with
timing, funding, resources and facilities structured toward
particular goals. Planning examines future alternatives
with an eye toward establishing a frame of reference for
current decisions. Strategic planning should visualize the
system as it is desired to be in the future, identify oppor-
tunities and threats, and provide a framework for alterna-
tive courses of action.
Planning should begin by identifying the areas of
concern, direction and goals. The next step would be defi-
nition of strategies, policies and plans to achieve those
goals. After the planning phase would come an establishment
of an organization or assignment of responsibilities to
implement the decisions. Planning, by its very nature, is
not a mechanical process. Central to it is the problem of
^Robert Ayres, Technological Forecasting and Long Range
Planning (New York, McGraw Hill Book Company, 1969), pp.
162 - 1637
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rational choice and prioritization ranging from the ends
desired to the allocation of resources.
2 . Forecasting
There are many concepts embraced by the term "fore-
casting." Forecasting encompasses such ideas as prediction,
prophecy, propaganda, and projection. Forecasting can be
defined as an attempt to anticipate or predict some future
event or condition, usually as the result of rational study
and analysis.^ There are four major steps involved in
forecasting : '*
1. Survey the alternatives, anticipate what occurrences
are possible and estimate their probabilities.
2. Investigate the interactions among the possible
alternative occurrences. Identify the situations
over which some control seems possible and estimate
the extent of that control.
3. Analyze preferences among the possible alternatives
and estimate how varying degrees of intervention can
change the associated probabilities.
4. Convert the results of analysis into a display from
which the impact of possible actions can be assessed.
Scenario construction and war gaming are useful
tools for prediction and projection. Scenario construction
can fulfill many objectives when used properly:^
1. Stimulate and stretch the imagination.
2. Clarify, define, name, expound, and argue major
issues
.
^E.S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions (New York,
Elsevier, 1975) p . 24D
.
"Ibid. P. 242.
^Herman Kahn, On Escalation : Metaphors and Scenarios(New York: Frederick^^STi Praeger , Fubiishers7^965 ) p. viii
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3. Design and study many alternative policy packages and
contexts
.
4. Improve intellectual communication and cooperation.
5. Furnish specific knowledge , conclusions , recommenda-
tions, and suggestions.
6. Clarify current choices, with emphasis on those that
retain flexibility for a broad ranges of contingen-
cies .
7. Increase the ability to identify and understand the
significance of new patterns and crises.
8. Improve the perspective of decision-makers and
increase their ability to react appropriately to the
new and unfamiliar.
Scenario construction, simulation and war gaming are
useful tools to the military planner, despite some shortcom-
ings. Perhaps one of the most significant advantages of
these devices is that they provide an opportunity to make
mistakes, and to profit from them. No lives or assets are
lost, they are merely in the wings waiting for the next
game. It is possible to study the effects of nuclear
exchanges, to practice operations in any areas and with
weapons of both the present and the future. This is an
important method for visualizing and preparing for tomor-
row's battles and for developing the organizations and
tactics of the future.
B. MODEL BUILDING
At the heart of systems analysis, operations research,
operations analysis and most other forms of analysis is the
concept of the model. A model is an idealization of the
situation appropriate to the problem.^ A model is an analog
^E.S. Quade,(ed.). Svstems Analysis and Policy Planning
(New York, Elsevier, 1968) p. 11.
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of reality. It is made up of those factors relevant to a
particular situation and the relations among them.^ A model
can be very close to reality. On the other hand, it may not
look like the real thing or represent all aspects of
reality. The important consideration is whether or not the
outputs of the model are reasonably appropriate and valid.
It is a means of producing measures of the costs and effec-
tivenesses of various alternatives.*
A problem of any complexity can require the use of more
than one model. It will often be necessary to have separate
models to examine different aspects of a problem. For
instance, the anticipated purchase of a new weapons system
may require a model of cost considerations, another of
performance characteristics, a third of personnel and
manpower requirements and a fourth of combat effectiveness.
Indeed, part of the job of the modeler is to determine what
is important and what is trivial. The analyst may go
several times through the cycle of building a model, experi-
menting with it, deducing its implications, and building a
better model
.
A model, which may range from a simple war game on a
sand table to an elaborate computer program, introduces a
precise structure and terminology to the examination of a
problem.
The technique itself can be a problem, however, because
systems analysis and the entire process of policy planning
are faced with uncertainty and alternatives which yield only
partially to quantitative reasoning. Sooner or later intui-
tive judgement becomes necessary. The potential for misuse
'R.D. Specht, "The Nature of Models." Systems Analys i:
and Policy Planning
,
E.S. Quade,(ed.), (New iork, t^lsevier.__,
.s
v . Oiiadp . C f^d . K C p Yn-r . Rl s^^ n h-r
'Ibid. p. 213., see also Karl Dersmach, Nerves of
Government
,




exists if the analyst, armed with model and criterion,
believes he can arrive at the optimal course of action to
recommend to the decision-maker. The best that can be
achieved is the ordering of uncertainty and the presentation
of rational alternatives. The model provides a way to
produce information about the outcomes that follow a choice
of alternatives.
C. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
According to E.S. Quade, systems analysis involves the
planning and design of new systems to perform existing oper-
ations better or to implement operations never before
performed.' Much of the analysts time is spent determining
just what the requirements are and how they can best be
achieved. System.s analysis is concerned with the systematic
analysis of major policy decisions.
Another definition, offered by Gene Fisher:
Systems analysis may be defined as inquiry to assist
decision-makers in choosing preferred future courses of
action by systematically examining and reexamining the
relevant objectives and the alternative policies or
strategies for achieving them; and comparing quantita-
tively where possible the economic costs, effective-
ness (benef its)
,
and the risks of alternatives.^"
Certain elements are common to all analysis problems,
although they may not always be explicitly identified by the
analyst. These basic elements are : ^
^




, p . 9 .
^"Gene H. Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems
Analysis (New York, Elsevier"; 1971) p~. 5T
^^E.S. Quade, Analysis for Military Decisions (Chicago,
Rand McNally and Company, 13~S^)^p'. 15 5 .
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1. The objectives - Systems Analysis is undertaken to
suggest or help choose a course of action. This
action must have an aim or objective. Alternative
courses are examined, compared, and preferred on the
basis of how well and how cheaply they can accomplish
the aim or objective.
2. The alternatives - The alternatives are the means by
which the objectives can be obtained. They are not
necessarily obvious . substitutions or designed to
perform the same specific functions.
3. The costs - Each alternative means of accomplishing
the objectives implies the use of specific resources
which cannot then be used for other purposes.
4. A model or models - As discussed in the previous
section.
5. A criterion - A criterion is a rule or test by which
one alternative can be chosen in preference to
another. It provides a means for using cost and
effectiveness to order the alternatives.
Systems analysis, particularly of the type required for
military decisions, is still largely a form of art . ^ ^ In the
process of analysis, eventually decisions must be made that
are thought to be right, but are not verifiable and cannot
be justified or checked in the output of the work.
D. OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND OPERATIONS ANALYSIS
Classically, there are three stages in operations
research. First, the behavior of the system is carefully
described, then the behavior is analyzed by constructing
models or theories of operation which are then




used to predict the effects on the system if it were changed
or modified . ^ ^
Operational research games are characterized by the use
of formal models to assess the effect of players' decisions
on the systems' states and to describe, to some degree,
player behavior . -^ "* The development of Operations
Research/ Systems Analysis tools and the advent of computer
technology brought about not only an increased usage of
gaming techniques,, but also broadened the spectrum of prob-
lems and areas which could be addressed. Some examples of
this might be high level military assessment problems
related to force level planning, armament and disarmament
alternatives and arms control. Operations Research gaming
theory can also provide a methodological contribution to the
problems related to alliances and cooperative defense in
regards to armament policies and balanced force structures.
The stated purpose of the Operations Research Society of
America is
:
The advancement of operations research through exchange
of information, the establishment and maintenance of
professional standards of competence for work known as
operations research, the improvement of the methods and
techniques of operations research, and the encouragement
and development of students of operations research. ^
^
Operations research, like other methods of analysis, has
both benefits and intellectual costs.
^^Paul Dickson, Think Tanks (New York, Atheneum, 1972.)
p. 22.
^"Reiner K.Huber, Klaus Niemeyer and Hans W.Hofmann,
Editors. Operational Research Games for Defense (Munich, R
Oldenburg VerlagT 1979^ pTT^
^^David B. Hertz (ed.) Publications in Operations






The very fact that someone can point out where an anal-
ysis has gone wrong strongly attests to the value of the
analytic approach.
Some pitfalls of systems and operations analysis must
always be taken into account. No method of analysis is
perfect; practitioners and users should be aware of the
mistakes that can be made : ^ "^
1. Failing to allocate and spend enough of. the total
time available for a study deciding what the problem
really is.
2. Examining an unduly restricted range of alternatives.
3. Trying to do too big a job.
4. Determining objectives and criteria carelessly.
5. Using improper costing concepts.
6. Becoming more interested in the details of the model
than in the real world.
7. Forcing a complex problem into an analytically trac-
table framework by overemphasizing ease of computa-
tion.
8. Failing to take proper account of uncertainty.
9. Treating the subject too narrowly - for example,
considering only "expected value" or "worst" cases.
However, in recent years, operations research has been
employed increasingly as an aid to highly placed decision
makers in industry, government, and the military.
Operations research attempts to describe, understand and
predict the behavior of man-machine systems operating within
organizational environments.^^ The application of operations
^^E.S. Quade, Analysis for Public Decisions Op. Cit
. ,
p,
300. ^ ' -^ f , f
^'These pitfalls were first articulated by E.S. Quade in
Systems Analysis and Defense Planning . They have since
become a classic statement warning of the limits of systems
analysis, see Gene Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems
Analysis Op. Cit., p. 16.
^«Ibid. p. 1127.
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research to specific problems is a useful, pragmatic tech-




Forecasting by means of projection of trends has been
commonly utilized as a method of investigating the future.
There are various methods available for analyzing trends in
data. The eventual goal of such analysis is the ability to
predict future data values based upon empirical evidence. A
trend can be defined as a tendency of values in a time
series to increase or decrease with regularity . ^ ^ Trend
analysis or extrapolation is based upon a comparison of the
same statistical population at different times. ^° Trends are
not cyclic nor are they connected with "seasonality." Some
form of formal trend methods in forecasting have been
applied to practically every area of futures research.
Trend analysis has been used as a methodological or concep-
tual baseline for more sophisticated methods which are often
employed. The analysis of trends is based on the empirical
examination of some phenomenon with repeated measurements
taken across time. Discovering trends depends upon looking
at a large enough time base. Otherwise, non-trend data may
lead to false conclusions about the actual trend involved.
The availability of time series data on the particular
phenomenon of interest is an elementary prerequisite. Trend
extrapolation forces a decision on exactly what problem is
of concern and on how that problem can be indexed
numerically
.
^^Hill, Kim Quaile. "Trend Extrapolation." The
Procedures of Futures Research . (n.d.) p. 250.
^"Jarol B. Manheim and Richard C. Rich, Empirical
Politica l Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
Inc. , I9S3) p. 108,
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The methodology of assembling statistical time-series to
plot trend lines and extrapolate likely developments is not
infallible. The existence of a trend is not a guarantee
that it will continue. Knowledge of trends, however, grants
more knowledge of likely developments. The construction of
a model is a combination of trend extrapolation and likely
developments designed to uncover connections and causal
relations between variables. ^^
The utility of trend analysis is its ability to be
predictive, albeit with a limited degree of success. The
analysis of trends, however, does not generally provide the
researcher with information about causality. Regression
methods, when used for prediction, tend to yield answers
which are probabilistic rather than deterministic. The
merits of trend analysis include:
1. Relative ease and economy of utilization.
2. Can be used often since trends abound.
3. A good starting point for further analysis.
4. Forces the researcher to learn about the subject.
5. Forces the researcher to employ other methods in the
quest for causality.
Trend analysis is a good baseline in the context of its
use in conjunction with other techniques. Its use alone
cannot significantly advance rigorous forecasting and causal
analysis. It is a method for exploring and refining many
forecasting problems and as a "first cut" approach to
defining the boundaries of the issue. ^^
^
^Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener, The Year 2000 (New
York: The MacMillan Company, 1967) p. xxviTi":





Any analysis must be conducted within certain "ground
rules". ^^ These are a set of propositions which are taken as
useful and acceptable simplifications for the sake of argu-
ment. First is the principle of cost benefit analysis.
Policy ought to be determined by systematic comparisons of
costs and benefits rather than by intuition or by the inter-
play of political pressure groups. The second principle is
the efficiency criterion. Costs and benefits should be
calculated in terms of overall achievement, as expressed in
the value of goods and services produced or foregone.
The essence of economic choice in military planning is
not quantitative analysis: Calculation may or may not
be necessary or useful, depending upon the problem and
what is known about it. The essential thing is the
comparison of all the relevant alternatives from the
point of view of the obiectives each can accomplish and
the costs which it involves; and the selection of the
best (or a "good") alternative through the use of appro-
priate economic criteria.^"*
The elements of a military problem of econom.ic choice
are similar to the elements of systems analysis as discussed
earlier. They are the objectives, alternatives, costs,
models, and criteria. However, economic choice is a way of
looking at problems and does not necessarily depend upon the
use of analytical aids or computational devices. ^^ Some
analytical tools such as mathematical models are useful in
analyzing complex problems, but there are many military
problems where they have not proven particularly useful.
^ Mack Hirshleifer and David L. Shapiro "The Treatment
of Risk and Uncertainty" Public Expenditures and Policy
Analysis Robert H. Haveman. (ed
. ) (Chicago : MarkhamPublishing Company, 1979) p. 291.
^
''Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics
of Defense in the Nuclear Age (New York, N.Y.: Atheneum,




Forecasting, planning, education and gaming have long
been areas of concern to the United States defense estab-
lishment. The forecasting and planning efforts attempt to
identify what the future role, mission, and goals of the
military might be, as well as to identify potential adver-
saries in possible conflicts. Education and training serve
to ready the' forces to fulfill their mission in an effi-
cient, timely manner. The game is the rehearsal for the
mission.
The defense effort should be approached as a decision
process geared to the concept of the "technological war".
Its government should be according to a strategy, rather
than by a series of independent technological or scientific
decisions
.
Technological warfare is the direct and purposeful
application of the national technological base and of
specific advances generated by^that base to attain stra-
tegic and tactical objectives.'^
.In The Strategy of Technology Possony and Pournelle
advocate the concept of a core structure to achieve this
aim. Some of the important elements affecting strategic
analysis are:
1. Government support in providing the resources,
setting the grand strategy of the nation, and in
justifying expenditures and courses of action to the
public
.
2. Technology to provide strategic analysis with new
possibilities, develop specific systems from military
requirements, create technology on demand, conduct
pure research and discover new fields of technology.
^ Merry Pournelle and David Possony, The Strategy of
Technology (new York, Atheneum, 1978) p. F3T —
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3. Development of the military arts to provide contin-
gency plans based upon an appreciation of capabili-
ties and limitations of all parties involved in a
potential future conflict.
4. Nonmilitary conflict experts; to provide the elements
of diplomacy, foreign aid, economic warfare, and
propaganda and psychological warfare to be coordi-
nated into the overall strategy.
In the defense systems analysis environment there is no
simple operational criterion of effectiveness that has the
role of profit or utility maximization in economic theory. ^^
As a result, a suboptimization framework is utilized which
fixes either a budget or level of effectiveness. In the
fixed budget approach, a specific cost level is used in the
attainment of a given objective. The analysis attempts to
determine the alternative, or combination of alternatives
likely to produce the highest effectiveness. The fixed
effectiveness approach, on the other hand, specifies a level
of effectiveness to be attained in the accomplishment of a
given objective. The analysis attempts to determine the
alternative or combination of alternatives likely to achieve





The Delphi Technique is a method of eliciting and
refining group judgments. ^^ It is a very early example of
^^Gene Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis
Op. Cit., p. 11.
*«Ibid. p. 10.
^
^Norman Dackley, "An Experimental Study of Group
Opinion. The Delphi Method. ', Futures. September, 1969.,
vol. 1. , no. 5.
,
p. 408. For additional background in the
development of the Delphi Technique see also: Bernice B.
Brown, 0. Helmer, and H.C. Dackley, The Delphi Method
,
II :
Structure of Experiments (Santa Monica, The Rand
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formalized, intuitive methods of research. The technique is
of direct relevance for the use of experts as advisors in
decision-making, especially in areas of broad or long-range
policy formulation. It is useful for the systematic solici-
tation and collation of informed judgments on a particular
topic. ^° The possible objectives of a Delphi can include: ^^
1. To determine or develop a range of possible alterna-
tives.
2. To explore or expose underlying assumptions or infor-
mation leading to differing judgements.
3. To seek out information which may generate a
consensus of judgement on the part of the respondent
group
.
4. To correlate informed judgements on a topic spanning
a wide range of disciplines.
5. To educate the respondent group as to the diverse and
interrelated aspects of a topic.
The Delphi Technique was developed by the Rand
Corporation in the 1950s. The procedure was designed to
obtain the most reliable consensus of opinion of a group of
experts through a series of questionnaires interspersed with
a series of controlled opinion feedback. ^^ The Delphi




Experts (Santa Monica. The Rand Corporation, JuTy"; ISSTJ
,
N . U . Dackley, Delphi (Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation,
October, 19b/)"; Bernice B. Brown, Delphi Process : A
Methodology Used for the Elicitation of Opinion Experts
(Santa MonicaT^ The^Rand^Corporat ion, September , 1968 ) , .
Helmer, and N. Rescher, On the Epistemology of the Inexact
Sciences (Santa Monica, The Rand Corporation, February
,
1959). ^ ^
^"Murray Turoff, "The Design of a Policy Delphi."
Technological Forecasting and Social Change. vol. 2., no
2., 19 7 0? ^ ^
^^Ibid.
^
^Harold A. Linstone, "The Delphi Technique." The
Procedures of Futures Research March, 1976.
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1. structuring of information flow.
2. feedback to the participants.
3. anonymity for the participants.
The method involves the following ten steps : ^
^
1. Formation of a team to undertake and monitor a Delphi
on a given subject.
2. Selection of one or more panels to participate in the
exercise. Customarily, the panelists are experts in
the area to be investigated.
3. Development of the first round Delphi questionnaire.
4. Testing of the questionnaire for proper wording.
5. Transmission of the first questionnaires to the pane-
lists .
6. Analysis of the first round responses.
7. Preparation of the second round questionnaires.
8. Transmission of the second round questionnaires to
the panelists
.
9. Analysis of the second round responses. Steps seven
and nine are reiterated as long as necessary to
achieve stability in results.
10. Preparation of a report by the analysis team to
present the conclusions of the exercise.
The Delphi Technique is a simple method which seeks to
impose some controls by checking the imformed guesses of one
set of observers with those of another. It is a synergistic
exercise made possible by the retention of anonymity.
I. CENTRALITY OF SCENARIO BUILDING
The 'scenario', an important element of most models,
simulations, or games delineates the modeler's concept of
whatever he is attempting to represent. The political-
military scenario is the mechanism which provides a context
for considering defense decisions, contingency plans, and
provides the background against which war games may be
played.
^
^Harold A. Linstone, "The Delphi Technique" Op. Cit .
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studies of the future are not efforts to predict per se,
but rather an effort to sketch "alternative futures" - in
other words, the likely results of different choices, so
that the polity can understand the costs and consequences of
different desires.^'* A scenario is a time ordered, episodic
sequence of events bearing a logical (cause-effect) rela-
tionship to one another and designed to illumine a hypothet-
ical future situation. A scenario is not and is not
intended to be either a prediction or forecast.-'^ Scenario
building can be approached as an effort to examine the total
costs of alternative plans. The heart of future studies,
whether of domestic or international affairs, or both, is
the effort to chart alternatives as the condition for policy
choices
.
The term 'scenario' is most often used to describe the
political-military events leading up to a crisis, as well as
the crisis itself. ^^ It may serve many other purposes in the
construction of a war game.^^
1. It may be used as a general background for defense
policy considerations.
2. It may be designed to provide the opening, setting,
or sequence of events in a war game.
3. The scenario may be utilized to provide an environ-
ment in which to examine the functioning of specific
weapons systems, or entire strategies.
4. More dangerous and less ethical, a scenario may be
designed to make a weapon system or strategy more
attractive in a particular environment.






^Robert U. Ayres . Technological Forecasting and
Long-Range Planning Op . Cit
. ,
p . xiv.
^^H.A. DeWeerd, Political -Military Scenarios (Santa
Monica. Rand Corporation. February , r¥6 7) p. 14.
''Ibid. p. 11.
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5. A scenario may be designed for contingency planning.
In addition, it may serve a heuristic function, reduce
the externality problem, and serve to expose alternatives
not obvious through analysis. The term scenario can also be
applied to : ^ ^
1. An outline of a sequence of hypothetical events.
2. A record of the actions and counteractions taken by
parties to a conflict.
3. A plan of action to be taken during a projected exer-
cise or maneuver.
4. The estimate of the situation by Commander "X" at
time "Y" in a war or war game.
5. A specific set of parametric values selected for a
given run of the computer.
A defense political military scenario can take many
forms. It may be extremely brief or as long as a book. It
may be a faithful representation of reality or may be a
fantasy depending entirely upon the purpose of its design.
The scenario can cover literally any level of detail in the
political-military spectrum. The design can be for attri-
tion modelling, movement in tactical games, decision
modelling for large scale global conflicts, insurgency oper-
ations, or anywhere in between.
In 1960, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
adopted the procedure of introducing his defense programs to
Congress by offering an elaborate description or scenario of
the world situation, against which congressmen were asked to
consider his proposals . ^ ^ As his tenure in office
progressed, McNamara continued to use scenarios as a means
of determining the advantages of alternative force postures
^"Seyom Brown, "Scenarios in Systems Analysis." Systems
Analysis and Policy Planning E.S. Quade (ed.). Op. C±zr~, p";
^^H.A. DeWeerd, Political -Military Scenarios . (Santa
Monica: The Rand Corporation. February"; 1959 ) p. 4.
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in relation to specific contingencies. He did not rely upon
cost-effectiveness calculations alone to determine force
structure; he also employed sophisticated analysis of poten-
tial political-military conflicts.
J. WAR GAMING
Wargaming is a tool to analyze large complex situations,
forecast the future, and to produce synthetic statistics
relating to real life situations where no statistics could
be produced otherwise. The results of any war game must be
examined carefully and used with caution. Nonetheless, war
gaming is useful in many ways : "* °
1. To aid training.
2. To test war plans.
3. To organize and analyze large groups of data.
4. To force decisions to be made and to permit specific,
concrete interactions among factors.
5. To check the credibility of decisions.
War gaming possesses the inherent advantages of simula-
tion, and provides a methodology for studying and examining
almost any scale or type of conflict. Gaming provides a
means of gaining useful experience and information in
advance of an actual commitment, of experimenting with
forces and situations that are too remote, too costly, or
too complicated to mobilize and manipulate, and of exploring
and shaping the organizations and systems of the future . "* ^
When, as in nuclear warfare, there are no precedents, no
historical examples to furnish guidelines, war gaming can
create its own history of artificial wars.
""M.G. Weiner, War Gaming Methodology (Santa Monica:
The Rand Corporat lonT" July 195 9) p. 21?
"•^Francis J. McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming(Newport, R.I.: The United States NavaT~Wa^~College , 1966)
p . 1- 25 .
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It is important as well to note what war gaming will not
do: "2
1. Provide the decision-maker with a predictive, opera-
tional tool.
2. Make allowances for idiosyncratic characteristics of
decisionmakers
.
3. Explictly provide a measure for determining reality.
Political-military games, due to these considerations,
are somewhat limited in their ability to test strategies or
forecast political developments with any real degree of
confidence. This does not, however, negate the worth of the
war game. It merely re-emphasizes the importance of basing
the scenario upon accurate assumptions and
conceptualizations
.
1. A Very Brief History
War games grew out of military chess which in turn
evolved from the ancient game of chess. The main objective
of both chess and military chess seems to have been to
furnish amusement. If one accepts such games as chess as a
form of war game, then the art of wargaming does go back to
the beginning of recorded history. However, as chess was
not recognized as a military training aid until sometime in
the eighteenth century, it cannot be included as a scien-
tific tool.
In the later part of the eighteenth century an
attempt was made to treat warfare as an exact science. This
was the first recorded use of war games as an aid to scien-
tific analysis of war situations. Great emphasis was placed
on mathematical theories and the scientific method became an
end in itself rather than the battle. In Germany a game was
developed called "The New Kriegsspiel , " The military men of
"•^Peter DeLeon, Scenario Designs : An Overview (Santa
Monica: The Rand Corporation. June , 1973)~p"^ 5"^
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the day became intoxicated with the model. Eventually they
had a difficult time in distinguishing the model from
reality. The "science" of wargaming suffered a setback as
Napoleon overran Europe, since he refused to fight the way
the model said he should.
In 1811, the wargame was transferred from the chess
board to a sandtable. The terrain was modelled in sand with
blocks of wood representing the military forces. Somewhat
later an improved model substituted plaster and included
woods, trees, villages, rivers, etc. Further modifications
were made in the next generation including the use of a map
instead of a sandtable, and a written set of rules for the
playing of the game.
Kaiser Wilhelm II ordered the game to be adopted by
the German army. As time progressed, more elaborate rules
for the conduct of the game were written, intricate calcula-
tions became involved, and umpires were needed to govern the
play. Improvements were made in the details of terrain and
statistics were gathered from past wars. The eventual
result was a game called Rigid Kriegsspiel.
A reaction to this type of gaming eventually set in
resulting in a different concept called Free Kriegsspiel.
In the Free Kriegsspiel an attempt was made to do away with
the rules and depend upon the judgement of the game director
for decisions affecting the play of the game. Free
Kriegsspiel continued as a training aid of the German mili-
tary and general staff until at least World War II. '*^
'* Further information on the subject of the history of
war gaming can be found in an address by Arthur W.
Pennington on the^history and classification of war gaming







Sandtable war gaming lends itself readily to the
reconstruction of historical battles.'*'* Care must be taken
to ensure accuracy. Every aspect of the battle has to be
considered in its correct context, and in correct chronolo-
gical order. To refight any historical battle realisti-
cally, care must be taken when constructing the terrain on
the sandtable, and the forces must represent the actual
numbers and technology available at the original battle.
Another alternative is to allow a modest leeway in command
style and chronological events, allowing for an other than
historic outcome.
This style wargaming lacks any utility for fore-
casting, but can be valuable as the wargamer may gain an
insight and understanding of the problems of the commanders






Manually played games may be used for training and
for investigations of tactics, strategies, or comparisons of
equipment. They are occasionally useful for prediction and
forecasting as well. A manual war game is defined as a
simulation of a real life situation conducted by any means
whatever where opposing forces are represented actively and
all decisions are man made . "* ^
Because of its flexibility and low equipment cost,
it is a useful technique, particularly of the simulation of
ground combat. A manual war game is characterized by two
'*
'*An introduction to this style wargaming may be found
in Donald Featherstone , Battle Notes for Wargamers (New
York: Drake Publishing, Inc. 1974)
"^J.B. Phillips, "Manual War Gaming" First War Gaming




opposing teams with some sort of umpire or control section.
In order to establish a manual game several criteria must be
met: '
'
1. The objectives of the game must be defined.
2. The scenario must be credible and relevant to the
objectives
.
3. The selection of the players and control personnel
must support the objectives.
4. The area and time scale must be established.
5. Procedures for the collection and evaluation of data
must be established.
In this type of game the forces are represented by models,
pieces, pins, or symbols. The participants move them about
by hand on a board, map, chart, or terrain model which
depicts the area of operations."^ Contacts and interactions
between forces are evaluated in accordance with the profes-
sional judgement of the umpires, or with the aid of rules,
measuring devices, graphs, or formulas.
4 . Machine Games
A machine game is considered to be a game conducted
on equipment or systems designed and constructed for the
express purpose of gaming. Machine gaming systems provide
electromechanical or electronic aids for the movement and
display of forces, the simulation of sensors and communica-
tions systems, and umpire bookkeeping and evaluation,"^
These are electromechanical or electronic versions of manual
games. This type war game is utilized across a broad spec-
trum of training and simulation. In what is perhaps its
most useful mode, machine games are used as training devices
"'Ibid. p. 8.






for military personnel from junior enlisted to flag offi-
cers. Examples of this style game are the Naval Electronic
Warfare Training System in Newport, the Anti Air Warfare
trainer in Dam Neck, Va., and the Anti Submarine Warfare
trainer in Norfolk.
5 . Computer Assisted Games
The advent of computers opened many new possibili-
ties for scenario construction and wargaming. In this type
of game the tactics of both sides are reduced to a computer
program which will compute the outcome of a battle when all
relevant data, such as weapons and sensor system parameters
are injected into the program. An inherent, major problem
which comes immediately to mind is that of constructing an
adequate data base. It is not a trivial task to attempt to
include a significant amount of data which is relevant to
the game. Each and every situation thought to be important
must be included in the program and a suitable response to
the situation programmed.
Another problem which arises quite frequently once
the game or simulation has started is that of real time
versus computer time inputs. Information which is fed to
the players of the game verbally must be orchestrated
closely with the information which they receive via the
computer program. If the two information sources are
allowed to run out of synch, the results can be mass confu-
sion, and invalidated results of the game.
Simulation is the representation of a system or
organism by another system or model designed to have a rele-
vant behavioral similarity to the original. All games are
simulations, but not all simulations are games. An example
of a simulation which is not a game would be a model
designed to study an inventory or logistics control system
or problem.
34
Computer simulation is an analytical technique using
mathematical or logical models to study the behavior of
actual or hypothetical events, processes, or systems over
extended periods of time.'*^ It is a means of gaining
experience and of making and correcting errors without
incurring the risks or costs of actual application.
.
^^ Garry D. Brewer and Martin Shubik, The War Game. ACritique of Military Problem Solving (Cam^ridgeT Mass : ~
Harvard University Pres"s:—r97 9) p. 9 .
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III. COMPOSITION OF SCENARIOS
There is no universal rule for scenario writers which
tells one what to include and what to omit. Neither is
there a universal form in which they should be
presented. They vary greatly according to the use to be
made of them. ^ °
A. THE PLANNER
The study of the art of war encompasses much more than
mere training in the empirical mastery of a warfare
specialty. Understanding why men fight is at least as
important as knowing how in the technological age. The
technological knowledge required of the modern military
officer conceals a serious trap. It has become all to easy
to get wrapped up in the day to day nuts and bolts and
neglect education in strategy and tactics. This is espe-
cially true for several reasons. First, the sheer volume of
technical knowledge necessary to carry out the mission
dilutes the amount of time available to a member of a mili-
tary system which does not employ a general staff organiza-
tion. Another problem which has arisen over the years is
linked to the increasing technological sophistication of the
systems as well. The political system which exists within
the military puts a premium on those officers who understand
the operation of the systems rather than those who
^"Rosenau, James, "Pre- theories and theories of Foreign
Policy" Approaches to Comparative and International Politics




understand the principles of their utilization. The study
of Jomini , Clausewitz, Schlieffen, and Moltke has gone out
of fashion in the training of the American military officer
corps. This is particularly unfortunate in that it appears
not to be the case among the officer corps of our worst-case
potential adversaries, the Soviet Union.
In the years since World War II, the United States has
become increasingly status-quo oriented. The oj*igins of
this attitude can be found in the policy of containment,
which was the first acknowledgement that the Soviet Union
was our next potential adversary.
George Kennan, onetime American ambassador to Moscow,
and by reputation the foremost Soviet expert in the govern-
ment, in 1947 published his Mr. X article in Foreign
Affairs . With this he became the mastermind of the strategy
of containment.^^ His intent was to suggest the political
containment of a political threat posed against the west by
Russia under Stalin. As containment evolved, it was trans-
formed into an intention to oppose by military means a
presumed Soviet determination to dominate the world by mili-
tary force. The United States, from a. position of wealth
and power never before achieved by any nation, embarked on a
foreign policy that substituted improvisation for invention
and reaction for action. Out of fear of another people's
ideology, the ideology of America suffered a deep change.
Containment, carried to extremes, became a paranoia which
prevented America from recognizing that she had slipped into
a national policy which merely reacted to the moves of the
Soviet Union. The United States became a nation without
objectives, without national goals, beyond that of
"containing" the expansion of the Soviet Empire.
^ Mames A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. United States
Foreign Policy and World Order (Boston, Little"; Brown and
Company, 1981") "pT 74"
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Containment, as it was originally conceived, would have been
a positive, offensive force. It would have worked actively
toward the lessening of the Soviet Union's political and
ideological influence not only in the international realm,
but also within the borders of Russia itself. It would have
encompassed an effort to break the grip of tyranny on
Eastern Europe while at the same time demonstrating to the
world that the forces of freedom were alive, capitalism
worked, and that Marxism-Leninism did not have the scien-
tific answers to history which it claimed.
The military planner must fight against this recent
heritage of status-quo orientation. The understanding of
technology, political objectives, and the theory of military
strategy are all important. It is all well and good for the
nation as a whole to be oriented towards the maintenance of
the status-quo, but the military at least must realize that
the enemy is expansionist, and without a theory of victory
we are lost
.
Military planning since the inception of containment has
been carried out in the absence of a clearly enunciated
United States national strategy. The common methods
employed for short range planning consist of identifying a
set of fixed interests, juxtaposing them on a fixed environ-
ment, and then creating a strategy for attaining these
interests within the constraints of that environment.^^ This
approach is useful for short range planning, but fails to
take into account the problem of uncertainty, which cripples
it for long range use. The problem of uncertainty of inter-
ests can be dealt with by defining them at a sufficiently
high level of generality. The problem of uncertainty in the
environment must be approached from a different tack. The
^
^Richard J. Glikes, "An Approach to Long-Range
Strategic Planning." (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania,
United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,
1978) p. 1. B , B
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future environment can be projected as a series of alterna-
tives, few enough to manage, but sufficient to cover the
likely important alternative trends. ^^ From this can be
devised a series of strategies to be called into play as
necessary
.
Several problems arise with this approach. Multiple
strategies can be contradictory to one another. It also
disregards the influence of the planner's own short and
medium term decisions ove-r the evolution of the environment.
The United States, as well as other countries has sufficient
power to affect the evolution of the environment.
1. The Ad Hoc Process
The real planning - that affecting long term needs,
ne
personal, ad hoc basis ^ '*
types and quantities of forces and providing foresight
into the future - is do by upper echelon leaders on a
A good case can be made that the actual process of
planning and decision-making bears a strong resemblance to
Lindblom's "science of muddling through."^ ^ Lindblom
believes that the theory on decision-making differs greatly
from what actually occurs.
Policy planning which attempts to take into account
all theory, data, values, and alternatives is unrealistic
and too unwieldy for day to day applications toward complex
problems. To its credit, this method yields clarity of
objectives, explicitness of evaluation and a high degree of
comprehensiveness of overview. The planners/decision-makers
must start from fundamentals anew each time, building on the
''Ibid. p. 1.
'"Gerald G. O'Rourke, "Great Operators, Good
Administrators, Lousy Planners.", United States Naval
Institute Proceedings August, 1984"; p": 75.
''Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through'
Public Administration Review
,
June 1959. p. 44.
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past theories and value systems, and always be prepared to
start completely from the ground up.
The means by which planning takes place is much more
an ad hoc process in a problematic context. Planning and
decision-making continually build out from the current situ-
ation, step by step, and in small degrees. The planner sets
as his principle objective a relatively simple goal, disre-
garding many alternatives, consequences; and values which
would have to be- examined in a more academic setting. The
practitioners expect to achieve their goals only partially,
they expect to have to repeat the process endlessly, as
conditions and aspirations change and as accuracy of
prediction improves. The test of a good policy is agreement
on the policy itself, not whether it achieves a particular
set of objectives.
At the lower levels of policy planning, many inputs;
underlying values, as well as collected data and historical
perspective, are considered. Both long and short term;
goals, objectives, and possible effects are examined. As
the problem passes up the chain of command, the aspects to
be considered are trimmed down until finally the ultimate
decision-maker makes the policy choice. The information he
receives is the basic problem pared down to a yes or no, go
or no go format. Although many alternatives and much infor-
mation have been considered enroute, the actual decision is
made in this manner. In this context, the short term
frequently triumphs over the long term.
2 . Legitimacy
Another aspect of strategic planning worthy of note
is the concept of legitimacy. This concept in many ways
cuts across the "realist versus idealist" problems of
decision-making, and does much to undermine the position of
the "pure" realist or pragmatist. Proponents of the
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pragmatic approach to decision-making simply cannot
completely disregard the American culture and context within
which they operate. Success is an important factor towards
the legitimization of any bureaucratic decision-making.
However, a plan or policy which did not take into account
the basic American value system, no matter how successful,
would not be judged to be legitimate in the eyes of the
American people. Indeed, the juxtaposition of pragmatic
interests and basic values underlines the difficulty of the
legitimization process in the American political and mili-
tary culture . ^ ^
B. CRITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Purpose
The preponderance of Americans, for at least the
last several decades, have exhibited an unwillingness to
acknowledge unpleasant realities. They seem to want to
believe only that which does not interfere with their own
personal tranquility. As an example, many people in this
country do not realize that NORAD is an empty shell, and
that the United States would be hard pressed to detect an
incursion of its air space, much less respond in a coordi-
nated, effective manner.
This trend of unwillingness to see reality seems to
be shifting slowly, but in the meantime the military plan-
ners must continue to create unpleasant scenarios in order
to formulate possible courses of action. Inadequacy of
knowledge frustrates prediction and hampers successful
programming, especially in a world characterized by techno-
logical change and by broad opportunities for individual
^^Frank M. Teti. "The Public Interest: In Search of an
Operational Definition.", (Prepared for the American Society
or Public Administration, n.p.,n.d.) p. 27.
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decision -making . ^ '
The utility of forecasting is greatly increased by
the use of a number of scenarios examining a number of
courses and responses . This is true whether the purpose of
the scenario construction is for wargaming or merely as a
heuristic exercise.
The purpose of all war games is pure or applied
research. Pure research, in the military sphere, is defined
as an attempt to gain a fuller understanding of political
and military interactions.^^ Applied research ranges from
data collection to the assessment of alternative strategies
and the identification of indicators by which to judge the
results of current operations.
In a broader sense, the purpose of each individual
game is tailored to produce the desired results. For
instance, if the purpose of the game or simulation is to
offer policy recommendations or implications, then the scen-
ario acquires a dominant role. Without a set of accurate
and relevant assumptions and predictions in the scenario,
the policy purposes would not be recognized and the game
results would be worthless.
2. Credibility
Any scenario designed for military research and
analysis, or for the opening of a war game, should be made
as credible as possible. The scenario should strive for a
high degree of consistency both within the scenario itself
and as close as possible a resemblance to the real world.
^'Irving^^H. Siegel, "Technological Change and Long Run
Forecasting." The Journal of Business of the University of
Chicago .
,
July,-T553. p. 146T — —
^'Wilson, Andrew. The Bomb and the Computer . (New
York, Delacorte Press, T9^8 ) p. TT8
.
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Game credibility is extremely difficult to achieve
in a scenario which is placed in a future oriented time
setting. For this type of game, credibility does not retain
the level of importance which it has in a more operationally
oriented case.
Critics of the credibility of scenarios must recog-
nize that a scenario is not prepared for the purpose of
predicting single future events. In an attempt to predict
single future events, one mistake invalidates the results.
In a well constructed scenario, the weakness of a single
event is compensated for by the credibility of the
remainder.
3 . Relevance
In some cases the research objectives, or defense
objectives must take precedence over credibility in the
design of a scenario. The designer must recognize when a
research project or war game is being carried out to examine
an otherwise obscure problem, and not to achieve complete
identity with the real world. ^^ In these cases relevancy
takes precedence over credibility.
Relevance also relates to the issue of validity. ^°
Since the scenario is often a representation of reality, it
is desirable to examine whether the analytical procedure
used is a reasonably good representation, within the context
of the problem at hand. In order to accomplish this, several
questions might be asked: ^^
^^H.A. DeWeerd, Political-Military Scenarios
Op. Cit., p. 11. ^
^°Gene Fisher, Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis
Op. Cit., P. 14. ^ ^
'^Ibid. p. 15.
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1. Can the model or scenario describe known facts and
situations reasonably well?
2. When the principal parameters involved are varied, do
the results remain consistent and plausible?
3. Can it handle special cases where an indication of
the probable outcome is known?
4. Can it assign or identify causes to known effects?
4 . Plausibility
The assumptions upon which the scenario rests are
vitally important for many reasons. If not grounded in
reality, the user is forced to suspend belief and the
results could suffer. At times, however, it becomes neces-
sary to stretch the imaginations of the participants in
order to serve the objectives of the exercise. An example
of this might be a scenario designed to forecast or examine
post nuclear war recovery phases in society and government.
A careful balance of credibility, relevance and plausibility
would be necessary in order to achieve useful results.
Almost all scenario construction must operate under
the constraints of incomplete or incorrect information.
Information which is unavailable or restricted access such
as actual nuclear targeting doctrine, decision-making
criteria within the governmental organizations of foreign
powers are obstacles which must be overcome within the scen-
ario. Careful attention to detail, along with best-guess
estimates, are vital to the scenario retaining not only its
plausibility, but also its utility.
C. CONSTRUCTION
1 . Time Setting
The time setting is an important parameter. The
setting can not be so near at hand that current events can
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intrude into the game nor can it be so far ahead in time
that it outruns the capacity of the players to conceive of a
consistent future. ^^ The further into the future the game is
set, the more artificial background material must be not
only provided by the scenario writer but also assimilated by
the players. In most cases, the ideal approach is to
provide a background just sufficiently removed from real
time that current events will not interfere, but close
enough to make the setting plausible in accordance with what
the players understand of the real world.
Another consideration is the lead time necessary for
the sponsors of the game to implement useful f indings . ^ ^ A
time setting too close to the present would not allow an
opportunity to implement useful findings. On the other
hand, a setting too far in the future might not command the




An obvious consideration must be the environment.
The more closely the initial construction of the scenario
resembles reality, the more plausible it will be. However,
changing the environment by removing it from immediate
political reality, can conceivably lead to the discovery of
entirely new problems and insights and provide a greater
emphasis on analytical results or generalizations.^"* For
example, the character of the study would be greatly modi-
fied by a scenario in which NATO had been dissolved, Mexico
was in revolution, various nation- states in addition to the




''Herbert Goldhamer and Hans Speier, Some Observations
on Political Gaming (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation,
T^5 9) p. 22. ^
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present nuclear powers were in possession of nuclear weapons
or if internal strife in the Soviet Union caused increased
international tensions.
A number of variants could be explored in which the
scope of the scenario is changed so as to encompass smaller
or larger political-geographical areas or more or less
specialized policy problems. ^^
3 . Level of Detail
The level of detail required in scenario construc-
tion is subject to a number of variables. The one which
comes most readily to mind is the purpose of the game. If
it is desired to test battle group tactics, then the level
of detail must be sufficient to take into account the param-
eters to be examined. Political considerations can be
ignored, as it would not be important to determine why the
battle started in the first place. If, on the other hand,
the desire is to model possible reactions of world leaders
to a given policy or course of action, the level of detail
required would be much greater, albeit in a different
direction.
The level of detail and complexity of a scenario
must take into account the level of expertise of the
players. If the scenario is designed for the use of battle-
group commanders, it will be of little utility for the
training of cabinet level politicians.
In the early days of American nuclear superiority
over the Soviet Union, the opening scenario for a general
war game conducted in the United States could be extremely
brief and simple. ^^ It often said that at a given time,
usually by surprise, the Soviet Union launched an airborne
''Ibid. p. 24.




nuclear strike against the continental United States. No
background data as to reasons for the attack, or political
considerations, were given. The simplicity of these
scenarios was accepted at the time on the grounds that what
was important was the American nuclear superiority, not the
political details relating to the situation under which the
attack was made . ^ ' The Strategic Air Command and the Soviet
Air Forces were the only factors which really mattered.
Alliances, the United Nations, and the uncommitted nations
of the world were disregarded. The military interchange was
where all attention was focused.
After the strategic balance shifted dramatically,
and the Soviet Union had within its power the ability to
seriously damage the United States, it became necessary to
consider a broader range of study in scenario construction.
The problems of limited war emerged, driving scenario
construction into a much more complex task. It became
necessary to consider scenarios where the superpowers did
something other than exchange nuclear blows, with the United
States winning in the end. The opening scenario had to be
much more definite about the conditions under which the
conflict commenced and had to address any conditions which
would or might act to limit the conflict. This led to the
construction of multidimensional scenarios of considerable
political and military complexity.
''Ibid. p. 3.
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IV, SCENARIOS IN USE
A. PRACTITIONERS
A phenomenon has taken place in the United States in the
years since World War II which is beginning to make itself
felt. It is a form of policy research, evolved from
research and development; variously called futures research,
prognostics, prospection, forecasting, futurecasting , futu-
rism, futurology, and futurists.^' Although futures research
consists of much more now, a definition of its origins might
be useful. Research and development are comprised of three
activities : ° ^
1. Basic research - The exploration of the unknown.
This is nondirected research with the desire to
pursue knowledge for its own sake as the motivating
influence
.
2. Applied research - Research directed to satisfying a
stated need. Applied research draws on basic
research and generates additional knowledge.
3. Development - The systematic use of basic and applied
research for the creation and production of tangible
objects, systems, methods or materials.
A few definitions of futures research may be helpful at
the onset : '' °
1. A forecast is a probabilistic statement, on a rela-
tively high confidence level, about the future.
^^Paul Dickson. Think Tanks Op. Cit . p. 310.
"'Ibid. p. 8.
'°Erich Jantsch, (ed.). Technological Forecasting in
Perspective (Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operatTon
and Development, 1967), p. 15.
48
2. A prediction is an apodictic (non-probabilistic
statement) on an absolute confidence level about the
future
.
3. An anticipation is a logically constructed model of a
possible future.
4. Technological forecasting is the probabilistic
assessment, on a relatively high confidence level, of
future technology transfer.
5. Exploratory technological forecasting starts from
today's assured basis of knowledge, and is oriented
toward the future.
6. Normative technological forecasting first assesses
future goals, needs, missions, etc., and works back-
ward toward the present.
The practitioners of futures research do not believe the
future can be predicted exactly, because there are too many
unknowns. However, they feel that man is creating his
future with each decision, discovery, action or inaction.
Since we are creating the future in the present, man should
be in a position to determine at least part of it. With an
increased perception of the consequences of actions and the
possibilities which "abound, more intelligent decisions
become possible.
1. Future Studies
a. The Rand Corporation
The United States, during World War II, found
itself at the forefront of the technological war. A corps
of civilian scientists and engineers performed remarkable
feats of research and development, on short notice, and
usually against a deadline. At the end of the war, with
this corps of civilians beginning to break up, the military
decided to retain some of these people in order to develop
military technology in the years ahead.
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In late 1945, approval was granted for an
arrangement between the Douglas Aircraft Company and the
Army Air Force to be called Project Rand. Project Rand,
Research ANd Development, was to be a unique experimental
institution with the stated mission of conducting "a program
of study and research on the broad subject of interconti-
nental warfare other than surface."^
^
By 1948, pressure had grown to separate Rand
from both Douglas and the Air Force. Project Rand became
the Rand Corporation, a nonprofit, independent enterprise.
According to its Articles of Incorporation, it was formed to
"further and promote scientific, educational, and charitable
purposes, all for the public welfare and security of the
United States."'^
Early Rand studies covered such topics as the
use of rockets for strategic weapons, nuclear propulsion,
gaming theory as it applied to warfare, new concepts of air
defense, new aircraft design, and high energy radiation.
One early Rand study led to the adoption of in-flight
refueling by military aircraft, while another led to the
widespread use of titanium in aviation and space technology.
'As Rand grew, the staff came to include polit-
ical scientists, economists, psychologists, and others so
that it would not be limited to the physical sciences. The
Rand Corporation continues to be a vital aspect of the
United States national security effort.
b. The Hudson Institute
The Hudson Institute was founded in 1961 by
Herman Kahn at Croton-On-Hudson, New York. An interesting




fellows is held low, and a large number of outside
consultants are utilized. The intial motto of the Institute
was "National Security - International Order." The first
five years of its existence were devoted almost exclusively
to defense policy research, but that has gradually changed
to include a variety of new areas.
The new motto which leads the Institute is
"Policy Research in the Public Interest." Hudson now exam-
ines topics ranging from thermonuclear war through devel-
oping whole continents, and the future of the Western World.
Research generated at Hudson is usually bold, outspoken, and
very general.
c. The Club of Rome
The Club of Rome was formed in 1968 by a group
of scientists, educators, economists, humanists, industrial-
ists, and national and international civil servants from ten
countries. The stated purposes of the club are to foster
understanding of the interdependent components; such as
economic, political, natural, and social, which make up the
global system; and to bring that understanding to the atten-
tion of policy-makers and the public at large. ^^ The Club
believes that fundamental problems have arisen around the
world not only as a result of past human failures, but also
of past successes. The organization has a somewhat pessi-
mistic viewpoint and believes that only an imaginative
change in global relationships can make a positive impact.
The solutions to the problems humanity faces, according to
the Club of Rome, are:"''*
'Man Tinbergen, coordinator, RIO : Reshaping the
International World Order, A Report to the Club of~Rome
(New ^ork: E.P. Button, 1976) p. STT
"''Ibid. p. 65.
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1. Limits to growth.
2. A new international economic order.
3. New mechanisms to protect the poor from starvation in
the midst of plenty.
4. New strategies for aid to the Lesser Developed
Countries
.
5. New understanding of the role and responsibilities of
transnational enterprises.
6. New forms of governance of international common areas
such as the oceans, seabeds , and the atmosphere.
Major global problems and opportunities are
closely interdependent, and they interact over time in
complex and unforeseen ways. The goal of a sustainable
future requires learning to live within constantly changing
natural and social constraints.
d. Global 2000
Global 2000 was a three volume report commis-
sioned by President Carter and delivered in 1980. It is
another example of the popular- pessimistic outlook for the
future of mankind. World production and gross world product
per capita have been growing steadily for at least a
century, with interruptions during the Great Depression and
World War II; life expectancy, a major indicator of human
welfare grows longer practically everywhere each year, and
pollution levels in developed countries are gradually being
reduced. World population growth rates, which caused such
concern, peaked about a decade ago, and are gradually
declining.''^ Despite these facts, Global 2000 paints the
future in very somber colors. Its thesis is that if present
trends continue, the world will be more crowded, more
polluted, less stable ecologically, and more vulnerable to
'^Ernest Schneider, "Global 2000; an Analysis", Hudson
Communique
,
November, 1981. p. 5.
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disruption than it is now. Barring revolutionary advances
in technology, life for most people on earth will be more
precarious in 2000 than it is now - unless the nations of
the world act decisively to alter current trends. ^^ Global
2000 sounds this alarm even though its own projections fore-
cast higher world income levels per capita, more food output
per capita, longer human longevity, and declining rates of
population, growth.
2 . Case Studies
a. Kahn
One major pioneer of scenario generation was
Herman Kahn. He developed several seminar gaming techniques
in the 1950s which are reflected in On Thermonuclear War.
Since that time he expanded beyond the political-military
realm and his later works are in the areas of economic and
technological forecasting. Despite the shift in emphasis,
his methodology has served well throughout the years and a
variety of topics. ^^
The late Herman Kahn was the founder, director,
and chairman of the Hudson Institute. He was a pioneer and
leader in the fields of public policy analysis and future
studies, as well as being a physicist, mathematician and
prolific writer. '* In the course of his life, he became
^^Gerald 0. Barney, (ed.). The Global 2000 Report to the
President : Entering the Twenty- i-irst Century . (Washington,
Government Print ing Office"; 1980
,
3~^ols . ) pT 12 .
^^The seminar gaming techniques were presented in
chapter 10 of On Thermonuclear war . Further works on the
subject appeared in On EscalaTion : Metaphors and Scenarios .
'
^Kahn authored such works as On Thermonuclear War
(Princeton, Princeton University Press"! 1961) , TTTinking
About The Unthinkable (New York, Horizon Press, 19 62), On
Escalationl MetaphoTs and Scenarios (New York, Frederick A.
Praeger, i'ublishers , 19^37,
~
THe Next 200 Years: A Scenario
for America and the World (New York, WTTliam Morrow and




The Year 2000 : A Framework for
Speculation (with Anthony J~. Werner) XNew York, The~
MacMillan Company, 19 67), The Emerging Japanese Superstate :
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particularly interested in the problems of cultural,
economic, and technological change.
Kahn made the study of the future, once the
exclusive domain of science fiction writers and prophets, a
vital part of the conduct of public policy and strategies of
survival. Through the technique of scenario construction,
and in conjunction with the statistics, projections and
trends provided by demographics, economics, history and
political science, sociology and the physical sciences, Kahn
surmised that humanity is in the midst of a great
transition.
The current trend of pessimism about the future,
popular with the intellegensia , is that the population
explosion, coupled with economic growth will prove cata-
strophic within a century; therefore, economic growth must
be severely limited. Kahn's position is that natural
social, political, and cultural forces are likely to slow
the growth of both population and production long before the
world encounters any fundamentally unmanageable problems of
supply or environmental pollution. Rapid worldwide economic
growth is desirable. The Third World must continue to
industrialize, and advanced technology must be employed to a
logical and reasonable degree. Human society is changing at
an accelerating pace to a post- industrial condition which
will eventually culminate in the worldwide emergence of new
economic and social organizations.
Mr. Kahn's concern is to make it possible to
plan ahead, to achieve the best possible course before the
future is overcome by events. In his work The Year 2000
Kahn uses America as the focal point, and constructs a
number of possible future scenarios. Probable power
Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice
Hall , r9T0T7~WorlQ Economic Deyel opment
,
1979 and Beyond
(Boulder, westview Press , 1979 ) , The Coming Boom (Boulder
,
westview Press, Inc., 1982).
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alignments and international challenges to American security-
are examined in detail. Questions of process in technology
and progress in planning and control of population growth,
food supply, agression, internal alienation and disruption,
economic cooperation and the rise of new nationalism are all
addressed
.
As industrialization spreads and as the world economy as
a whole becomes super- industrial , the system at first
tends to become "problem prone" simply because of the
scale and lack of expertise with the new technolo-
fies...we expect the super industrial society to become
argely problem controlled sometime early in the next
century
J
at which time the transition to a post-
industrial economy can begin in earnest. ^^
In The Coming Boom Kahn's research leads him to
believe that the world economy should expect higher growth
rates for several reasons. Some of these are : ^
°
1. Cyclical recovery - Kahn revives the concept of the
Kondratieff cycle. Kondratieff was a Pv.ussian econo-
mist who lived in the late 1700s. He theorized long
term cycles of price movements, interest rates, and
wages in Western economies. Kondrat ief f ' s idea of
long term is illustrated by the fact that he success-
fully predicted that the "Great Depression" would
start in 1922. His theories have been out of vogue
but are useful for insights and explanations of
recent developments.
2. Adequate control of inflation is becoming a reality,
and the costs of coping with residual inflation and
the expectation of inflation are being reduced.
'^Herman Kahn, The Coming Boom. (Boulder, Westview
Press, Inc., 1982) pT-4 6.
'°Ibid. p. 15.
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3. Improvements in economic indexing. Kahn points out
that when set in constant dollars, the federal




5. A long term capital boom is beginning, increased cash
flow and savings are becoming evident
.
6. Improvements in productivity are being made.
The projections of the future developed by Kahn
are based upon a historical context which he states has
passed through two phases so far.^^ The first was the agri-
cultural revolution which took place some ten thousand years
ago and required eight thousand years to spread. The second
phase is the "Great Transition" and started with the
Industrial Revolution. The current world economy is classi-
fied as super industrial and technological. From this is
projected the scenario of the future post industrial world
economy
.
Barring some "perverse combination of bad luck
and bad management" the outlook for the future is decidedly
optimistic. The dramatic increase in birthrates which
started circa ,1700 will peak in this century and begin
declining. The major underlying reason for this will be the
spread of technology/ industrialization throughout the world.
Children in urbanized/affluent societies are consumers, not
producers as they were in more primitive societies in the
past. In other words, there will be social and cultural




The technological battle is being fought even more
intensely today, in peacetime, than it was fought at the
height or hostilities in World War II. But a brand new
thing has been introduced in the battle - no actual
battles. We have today no substitute for the sobering
effects of actual experience except pallid and hypothet-
ical paper studies and peacetime tesus. As a result,
both the estimates and the expectations of each side are
likely to be widely out of line with reality.*^
Before his research shifted to economic and
social forecasting, Herman Kahn was intensely interested in
the problems posed by the potentials of nuclear warfare. It
was in this field that Kahn first became aware that
scenarios could create "propaedeutic and heuristic methodol-
ogies and frameworks."'^
Propaedeutic is defined as introductory instruc-
tion, although with no suggestion of the elementary.
Creative integration of ideas can normally be accomplished
only in a single mind, therefore even a very sophisticated
and knowledgeable policy-maker, analyst, or long range
planner must absorb many ideas from unfamiliar fields.
Heuristic refers fo that which serves to discover or to
stimulate investigations, or to methods of demonstration
that lead a person to probe further. Heuristic techniques
are not necessarily rigorous or scholarly but are valuable
for obvious reasons nonetheless.
The approach to heuristic learning experience
taken in On Thermonuclear War is the basis for Kahn's later
exercises in scenario construction. He begins in chapter 8
with a synopsis of the real past, starting with World War I
and ending with the atomic bombing of Japan in 1945. In the
next chapter, a hypothetical past, starting in 1951 is
created. This framework is used to discuss the emergence of
'^Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War . (Princeton,
Princeton University Press , 1951) p.^TS'S.
On Escalation : Metaphors and Scenarios Op. Git. pVlll .
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Russia as an Asiatic and European power, a peacetime
revolution in the art of war, and to offer speculation on
unexpected operational gaps.
Beginning with chapter 10 is a projection of
possible future developments. Some of the items examined
are: '"
1. Arms control effects and techniques.
2. Experimental nuclear explosives,
3. Satellites.-
4. Soft and hard missile deployment systems.
5. Airborne command and control.
6. Civil defense possibilities.
7. Possible Soviet capabilities.
8. Long versus short war scenarios.
An interesting point made is that of the prema-
tureness of minimum deterrence and the possiblity of Soviet
strategic superiority.^^ This was contrary to the popular
wisdom of the time, but was a very astute observation,
nonetheless
.
b. Airland Battle 2000
Airland Battle 2000 is the document which the
United States Army has designed to educate personnel at the
flag rank what to expect in the battlefield of the future.
The concept was designed to guide future organizational
alignments, doctrine, training, and material requirements.^^
The methodology utilized by the Army was primarily trend
extrapolation. Trends which the Army believes will affect
society and specifically the military include:*''
'"Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War Op. Cit p. 45 3.
"'Ibid. p. 475.
'^U.S. Army, Airland Battle 2000 (Fort Monroe, Virginia,
Headquarters , United STate's Army Training and Doctrine
Command, August, 1982), p. 6.
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1. Proliferation of Nuclear Technology.
2. Increased foreign investment in technology.
3. Dwindling U.S. production base.
4. Decreasing U.S. and Soviet military age population.
5. Growing worldwide urbanization.
6. More diverse lifestyles.
7. U.S. becoming an information based society.
8. Soviet power projection.
9. U.S. and Soviet investment imbalance.
10. World political and economic interdependence.
11. U.S. energy and strategic material dependency.
The Army recognizes that trends are often inter-
woven, if not dependent on one another; and paints an inten-
tionally bleak picture for its general officers. Although
they believe that conflict against the Warsaw Pact in
Central Europe remains the most dangerous threat to American
security, they do not consider it the most likely. The
intention is to prepare for the "worst case" scenario, with
the belief that smaller crisises can be encompassed.
Some of the objectives of the Airland Battle
2000 concept include:
1. Prepare to fight anywhere. Worldwide turmoil caused
by direct Soviet interference and their war by proxy
methods make it necessary for the U.S. to develop
forces which can operate in all types of terrain,
climate, and warfare situations.
2. Win the land battle. The purpose of military opera-
tions cannot be simply to avert defeat or maintain
the status quo, it must be to win.
3. Maintain weapons parity. Parity is gained through
quality of weapons, reliance on technology, tactics,
leadership, and national will.
Ibid. p. 8.
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4. Avoid high combat losses. Victory must be sought
through maneuver, advantageous positioning of forces,
use of deception, psychological efforts to erode the
enemy's will, and exposure of minimum friendly forces
to destructive weapons effects.
The Army scenario for the battlefield of the
next century is one dense with sophisticated combat systems
whose ranges, lethality, and employment capabilities surpass
anything known in contemporary warfare. The airspace over
the battlefield will be saturated with aerial and space
surveillance, reconnaissance, and target acquisition
systems. The conflict will be intense and devastating,
making it extremely difficult to exercise effective command
and control. No single weapons system will dominate the
battle, and it will be fought with integrated systems from
all the services.
Battlefield mobility will be essential for
success. Forces will plan from the outset to fight in the
conventional, chemical, biological, nuclear, electronic
environment.
c. Field Manual 100-5
There is no simple formula for winning wars. Defeating
enemy forces in battle will not always insure victory.
Other national instruments of power and persuasion will
influence or even determine the results of wars . Wars
cannot be won, however, without a national will and
military forces equal to the task.^^
Field Manual 100-5 is the United States Army document
concerned with their conduct of possible future conflicts.
Should conflict occur, it is "the Army's keystone How to
Fight manual. "^^ The manual emphasizes conventional warfare
^'U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5 (Fort Monroe, Va.,
Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine
Command, 1980) p. i.
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but contains several sections devoted to operating in the
nuclear and chemical environment.
The manual is a compilation of scenarios and
responses covering a wide range of possible conflicts. It
is divided into four basic parts:
1. The Army and how it fights - This section discusses
challenges, combat fundamentals, weather and terrain,
battlefield environments, combat support and logis-
tics, tactical intelligence, and conduct of opera-
tions (command and control).
2. Offensive operations - A discussion of the purpose of
the offense, maneuver warfare, operational concepts
and a historical perspective (the battle of
Vicksburg)
.
3. Defensive operations - Contains the fundamentals and
scope of the defense, retrograde operations, defense
and breakout of encircled forces and rear area
protection.
4. Joint, contingency, and combined operations - NATO, a
Pacific theater, other possibilities.
Appendix B is a statement of the United States
Army's Principles of War. It is interesting to note that
the principles as listed and defined are straight
Clausewitzian; i.e., objective, offense, mass, economy of
force, surprise, maneuver, etc. However, nowhere is von
Clausewitz mentioned. Instead British Major General J.F.C.
Fuller is credited with developing them during World War I.
One might wonder what sort of military history is being
taught at West Point.




1. Survey of Themes of the Popular Mind
A selected survey of the literature of science and
speculative fiction and non-fiction can illustrate an appli-
cation of heuristic and intuitive forecasting methods to the
field of National Security Affairs.
• Robert Anson Heinlein, a 1929 graduate of the United
States Naval Academy, has been called the dean of science
fiction. He is noted not only for being a consummate story
teller, but also for grounding his works solidly in science
fact. According to Heinlein, ninety percent of all science
fiction is trash, which is simply an extension of
"Sturgeon's Law" - ninety percent of everything is trash. ^°
A good science fiction writer needs to know law, science,
geography, technology, psychology, economics, military/
political science, mechanical engineering, and an infinite
number of other things if he is to make reasonable project-
ions into the future. Construction of scenarios of
possible futures is his livelyhood. A very important attri-
bute to success is an insatiable curiosity. All scenarios
have assumptions; the more exacting the research, the more
credible, plausible and relevant the scenario can be. In
this respect, the writer of speculative fiction does much
the same thing as such organizations as the Hudson
Institute, The Club of Rome and the Rand Corporation. They
all ask "what if?" questions. They all spend most of their
time studying and the rest writing.
Much of science and speculative fiction has been
heavily influenced by the socio-political realities of the
times. For instance, during the late 1940s and early 1950s
^"Robert A. Heinlein, "Science Fiction and its Impact on
American Society", (Forrestal Lecture Series, U.S. Naval
Academy, 1973)
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efforts such as the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan and the Baruch
Plan were focusing much attention to the concept of interna-
tional control of atomic weapons. Robert Heinlein
constructed a scenario in which such an organization was
realized, and then posed the question - who will watch the
guardians? The result was the short story "The Long Watch."
With its locale set on the moon, the story only preceded
available technology by a decade or so, but pointed out some
very real difficulties with a concept that was at the time
under serious discussion.
2. Themes ^ Questions and Issues
At the turn of the last century, H.G. Wells
published Anticipations in which he predicted some social
changes with great accuracy and fell completely flat with
others. Wells was one of the first writers to recognize the
importance of technology and to attempt to derive social
consequences from specific innovations.^^ According to
Wells, the nature of technology is that it is cumulative and
it becomes diffused. In other words, it is cumulative due
to a simple test of functional efficiency similar to cost
benefit analysis; and it diffuses, or spreads, because the
savings in time, effort, and money quickly become apparent.
Wells based most of his predictions on the revolu-
tionary consequences of the changes in transportation both
in overcoming the problem of distance and in spreading the
span of organization.^^ His reliance on technology lent a
mechanistic cast to his thinking and Wells did not take into
account the impact of individuals upon history.
^
^Herman Kahn, The Year 2000 Op. Cit . p. xviii
^ ^Ibid. p. xviii
.
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Many others attempted early efforts at technological
forecasting, with a strong emphasis on social consequences,
in the field of science fiction literature. Science and
Speculative Fiction, despite being designed as entertaining
storytelling, is essentially an unstructured think tank in
which authors of differing points of view can paint
differing solutions or eventualities suggested by present
problems or situations. The explorations of science fiction
are normally for the purpose of testing an idea, a question,
or a possibility in the literary library.
This genre is worthless as prophecy, which it was
never intended to be. However, it has had an influence in
the exploration of the human implications of science and
technology. In addition, it has been useful for arousing
interest in, and furthering the cause of, specific develop-
ments in science and technology. It is common knowledge
that the first American space shuttle was named the
Enterprise after the starship of television fame, not its
naval predecessors. The Nautilus, the world's first nuclear
powered submarine, drew its name from Captain Nemo's vessel
in the novel 20,000 Leagues Under the Sea written by Jules
Verne long before any serious attempt was made to split the
atom. Many scientists or military men have described
detailed systems, missions, and battle scenarios in the form
of fiction. One famous example of this style writing was a
series of works produced during and after World War I by the
Italian Giulio Douhet , who predicted that future wars would
be won by air power; and described some of the tactics and
targets of such wars . ^ ^ Douhet was wrong on many points,
particularly his assessment of the effectiveness of stra-
tegic bombing, but he saw clearly and influenced the
^
^ Technological Forecasting and Long Range Planning Op.
Cit. p": 5~;
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direction of future trends in warfare.^"*
Since the time of H.G. Wells many writers of specu-
lative fiction have attempted to forecast alternative future
scenarios. Some, like George Orwell and Aldous Huxley, have
been accepted into mainstream literature. Others will
remain forever obscure. Many of the best writers of specu-
lative fiction address themselves at some time in their
career to subjects which are germane to the student of stra-
tegic planning. Warfighting, nuclear holocaust and post-
holocaust environments are some examples.
Beyond this, however, are the background themes and
issues found in the genre. Themes which reoccur in the
field include:'^
1. The importance of technology and progress to the
problem- solving process.
2. The importance of strong leadership to overcoming
problems
.
^"For an interesting and informative treatment of
Douhet , Mitchell, Serversky , and the history of strategic
bombing, see Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age .
(Princeton, Princeton University Press , 1959
)
^^Some of the better examples available in the field of
high technology, computers and robotics are Isaac Asimov, I,
Robot (Greenwich, Conn.. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1950),
and The Robots of Dawn (Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday and
Co. ,~TncTT r9^3^ Robert Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh
Mistress (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1966^7 Arthur C.
Clarke , Rendezvous with Rama (New York, Ballantine Books,
1973), and Roger Zelazny^ My Name Is Legion (New York,
Ballantine Books, 1976), In the fi^Td or Warfighting are a
number of excellent works; such as, David Drake, Hammer '
s
Slammers (New York, Charter Communications, Inc
.
, 19 7 9
Gordon Dickson, The Tactics of Mistake (New York, Daw Books,
Inc., 1971), and~ted^) CombaTt SF (New York, Charter
Communications, Inc., 1975 ) , Robert Heinlein, Starship
Troopers (New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), and Jerry
Pournelle , Jannisaries (New York, Ace Books, 1980), King
David' s Spaceship (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1980) , The
Mote in God ' s Eye (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1974), Tn~
the poTritical/ cultural area are Isaac Asimov, The Foundation
Trilogy (New York, Doubleday and Company, Inc .7^950 ) ,Arthur C. Clarke, Childhood s End (New York, Ballantine
Books, 1953), Robert Hemlem, "Doubles tar (New York, The New
American Library, 1951), Revolt in 2100 ~tNew York, Street
and Smith Publications, Inc . , 193^)"; STarship Troopers (New
York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1959), The Moon is a Harsh—
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3. The ability of one man to make a difference.
4. The belief that there will be no absence of war and
conflict
.
One of the most prevalent, recurring themes in the
popular mind is that of moral behavior and patriotism; not
moral in the religious sense, but in the survival sense.
Survival behavior is moral behavior, the simplest form is
when a man fights to preserve his own life. The next level
is when he fights to preserve his family. Another step up
the ladder is when a man is willing to fight to protect a
group larger than his immediate family, such as a village or
tribe. When he is willing to give his life for a group so
large he cannot possibly know all its members - that is
called patriotism. The ultimate is to fight for the
survival of the entire human race.
Another theme which surfaces quite often is that of
the military and military trained individuals becoming
essential to the reconstruction effort in a post-holocaust
environment. For instance, Alas
,
Babylon written in 1959,
and set in a small town in Florida, postulates the survival
efforts of a community surrounded by the aftermath of a
nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Although the town itself was not struck, the effects of the
Mistress (New York, G.P. Putnam's Son's, 1966), I Will Fear
No Evil "(New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1970). and STF7 Van
Vogt"; The Weapons Shops of Isher (New York, Ace Publishing
Company, 1951 j , and the World of Null-
A
(New York, Berkley
Publishing Corporation, 1945 ) . In the category of
holocaust/post-holocaust the classic works are Pat Frank,
Alas , Babylon (New York, Bantam Books, 1959), and Walter M.
Miller, Jr.
,
Canticle for Liebowitz (New York, J.B.
Lippincott Company , 1959 ) , However , there are many other
fine examples such as Dean Ing, Single Combat (New York, Tom
Doherty Associates, Inc., 1983), Alan Drury , The Hill of
Summer (New York, Pinnacle Books, 1981), and The Promise
Summer (New York, Pinnacle Books, 1982), Robert Hemlem,
Farnham s Freehold (New York, G.t'. Putnam's Sons, 1964), and
The ii'ifth Column btephen King, The Stand (.New York, New
American Library , 19/8), Larry Niven and Jerry Pournelle,
Lucifer ' s Hammer (New York, Fawcett Crest, 1977), and David
Graham, Down to a Sunless Sea (New York, Ballantme Books,
1981).
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war were on all sides. Survival in the post-nuclear
environment was handled well by the author, with a
surprising amount of detail. The problem of organizing and
protecting the community fell by default to the military
reserve and retired officers who resided in the town at the
beginning of the war. Governmental organization, police
action and defense became the concern of those who were
trained to lead and command.
In the course of examining the important works of
the field, all the major theoreticians of Western reality
can be found. Max Weber, Marx, Durkhiem, and Freud are all
represented.
Examples of knowledgeable writers in this area
include Robert Heinlein, Gordon Dickson, David Drake, and
Jerry Pournelle. The ideas which are heavily stressed are
specialization, universal rules, and functional multiplica-
tion (synergism). The membership of certain groups had to
meet minimum criteria and abide by common rules.
An example of this style is Robert Heinlein'
s
Starship Trooper . In this story, in order to become a
citizen, military or governmental service was a requirement.
One could exist as a resident without participating in a
service; however, one could not vote, hold an elected
office, or have any other rights associated with
citizenship
.
One finds the Freudian element represented by such
authors as John Varley, Isaac Asimov, and Ray Bradbury.
They delve into the question of social identity, impulses,
emotions, and the concept of the -mind as a closed system.
Marx and Durkhiem theories of class and group identities can
be found in a number of examples. One of the best is Robert
Heinlein' s The Moon is a Harsh Mistress . It combines class
struggle, group identity, libertarianism, and high tech-
nology in a story of revolution. Set several centuries in
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the future, the moon has become a giant Botany Bay, housing
the majority of Earth's misfits, political prisoners, and
criminals. Once sentenced, there is no returning to Earth.
The colony has been in operation long enough that several
generations were born there, however, all are treated as
criminals. The society lives in large underground cities,
with an economic system imposed by "Lunar Authority" , an
organization based on Earth and out of touch with its
charges. The citizens of Luna, originally not a homogenous
group, develop a group identity, as well as a feeling of
patriotism toward what was formerly their prison as the
revolt gains momentum. All in all, the book is an inter-
esting study of a number of motivating theories.
This type of literature, while without value as a
prediction tool, relates easily to Herman Kahn's arguments
for scenario construction. It can serve to stimulate and
stretch the imagination; clarify, define, name, expound and
argue major issues. It can design and study many alterna-
tive policy packages and contexts as well as improve -the
perspective of decision-makers and increase their ability to
react appropriately to the new and unfamiliar.
C. ALTERNATIVE COURSES
War is an art; it is not an exact science. Precisely
because there is an intelligent opponent, there are real
uncertainties about war, not merely statistical uncer-
tainties which may be measurable. Every attempt to
reduce war to an exact science has ended in dismal
failure. The advent of the computer and systems anal-
ysis, useful as both may be. has not changed this fact,
although it has often been forgotten. ^^
^^The Strategy of Technology . Op. Git. p. 15
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1. Hackett, et al.
An interesting development in the field of scenario
building has been the professional soldier or political
scientist writing on his subject for the popular market.'^
Examples of this are General Sir John Hackett 's, The Third
World War, and Show of Force by Charles D. Taylor. ^^
Hackett, a retired NATO general, has put together a credible
scenario for a Soviet offensive through the Fulda Gap into
West Germany. It is quite detailed and draws heavily upon
his many years of military experience in the defense of
Western Europe.
Taylor, a naval historian has created a scenario of
a United States - Soviet Union naval engagement in the
Indian Ocean during a period of increased tensions between
the two countries. His political background of the scenario
could be stronger, but his expertise on naval weapons
systems, capabilities, and tactics is very strong.
Both works are presented as dramatic accounts of the
events leading to and resulting in armed clashes which could
easily escalate to global conflict. A similarity between
them is the reluctance of both superpowers to cross the
nuclear threshold. Taylor's scenario, being solely a naval
engagement, was credibly kept in the conventional arena.
The Third World War
,
however, being set in the European
environment, delves much deeper into the political-military
decision-making processes concerning the possible use of
nuclear weapons. As the Allied counter-offensive begins to
^^Other examples of this are: Whitley Strieber and
James Kuneta, Warday and the Journey Onward
,
(New York,
Holt. Rinehart and WinsTon, 1984) , and Edward Zuckerman, The
D^y After World War Three. (New York, The Viking Press,
^^General Sir John Hackett, and other NATO officials.
The Third World War : August
,
1985 (New York, Berkley
FlTblishing uompany, 19787, and Charles D. Taylor, Show Of
Force (New York, Charter Communications, Inc., 198X7
69
take effect, the questions arise as to political aims. Some
of the options are : ^
^
1. A return to the status quo.
2. A reunified Germany - and the problems and fears
which that would generate.
3. The possible advantages of pushing the Soviet Union
back to the Russian borders and freeing all the
Eastern European satellites.
4. The risk that a Western attack would trigger a
nuclear war.
2. Pournelle
Liberty, in particular, was a primary goal of the
Framers . However - important as the other goals may be,
if we cannot provide for the common defense, we will not
survive to celebrate the 200th anniversary of the
Philadephia Constitution. ^ °
°
An interesting cross between the ration paradigm and
the radical empiricists is Dr. Jerry Pournelle. He is a
highly respected contributor to the defense effort of the
United States, as well as being a prolific writer in the
fields of science and speculative fiction. In 1970, in
conjunction with Stefan T. Possony, Dr. Pournelle wrote The
Strategy of Technology . The book described the present
state of technological decision-making, used examples to
illustrate past mistakes, and provided suggestions for
future approaches to a strategy of technology designed to
win the "Technological War."^°^
''The Third World War: August, 1985 Op. Cit . pp.
362-365": —
^°°J.E. Pournelle (ed.) Men of War. There Will Be War
Vol. II. (New York, Tom DoheFty Associates'^ IncT^ t98"z+) p.
^"^Ibid. p. 36.
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Elements of a technological strategy, as proposed,
entail a fundamental restructuring of the entire decision
process to allow "government of the Technological War
according to a strategy, rather than by a series of indepen-
dent technological or scientific decisions ." ^ ° ^ Strategic
analysis is at the core of this strategy, with the purpose
of seeking the proper use of available and future weapons;
orchestration of research plans, hardware construction,
intelligence operations, or even future battles. Some of
the elements which affect strategic analysis were presented
in chapter two in the discussion of the defense effort.
During the 1960s Dr. Pournelle worked as editor and
principal investigator for the Ballistic Systems Division of
the United States Air Force Systems Command. His research
was for a program called Project 75. Project 75, at the
time highly classified, pulled together into one document
everything known and predictable about ballistic missile
technology; structures, guidance, accuracy, warheads,
yields, basing modes, security, command and control, and
communications
.
Project 75 dealt with the real and projected capa-
bilities of the United States, and contained the best esti-
mates available of Soviet current and projected
capabilities. From this was drawn a study on stability and
strategic doctrine. The experience Pournelle gained working
on these projects formed much of the basis for his later
works both in political science and science fiction.
The Pournelle theory of deterrence is very simple:
When defensive systems are stronger than offensive ones, the
situation is stable. When the offense dominates, it




Assured Destruction and Mutually Assured Destruction. In the
Strategy of Technology the authors proposed a doctrine of
Assured Survival. This was not well received among most
defense intellectuals. Pournelle's point is that if you
don't have a defense, and your offensive systems are
rendered vulnerable, you are left with nothing except a
first strike capability - hence a destabilizing situation.
Active defenses should be high on the priority list.
Pournelle uses the vehicle of science fiction to
reach untold numbers of people with his message of a strong
national defense and the necessity to defend the freedoms
Americans enjoy. Some of this audience might become more
aware of the nature of the struggle because of this; every
one is a victory.
Throughout the recent decades when the United States
military was not very popular with the citizenry it
protected, the genre of science and speculative fiction
upheld respect for the profession of arms. In other parts
of the world, military history is a respected intellectual
discipline. In the United States, since the Vietnam War,
that has not been the case. In fact, since the close of
World War II, the United States military has not provided a
good showing, nor had the opportunity to prove its worth.
The advent of nuclear weapons has created a superpower
balance which has precluded the use of American conventional
military, force in many instances. The result so far of
America's disaffection of her military has been the advent
of the all volunteer force. For a number of years, both the
military and anyone who studied war were held in a good deal
of contempt. This state of affairs is changing, as well it
should. A nation which despises its soldiers will all too
soon have a despicable army.
The depressing fact is that history is remarkably clear
on one point: Wealthy republics do not last long. Time
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after time they have risen to wealth and freedom* the
citizens become wealthy and sophisticated; unwilling to
volunteer to protect themselves; they go to conscrip-
tion; this to becomes intolerable; and soon enough they
turn to mercenaries , ^ ° '*
This is not to say that the United States Military
is becoming a mercenary force. On the contrary, the country
is currently experiencing a rebirth of patriotism, and
coming to the realization that our pluralistic, open society
is worth protecting. The challenge, then, is to nurture
these new old feelings and provide the country and the mili-
tary with positive goals and objectives.
A revolutionary force, as distinguished from a reac-
tionary force, is one which moves not backward against
the flow of change but forward with it. . .The one force
which can claim the revolutionary title in the world we
live in, the one force which can claim to move in the
direction of life, is the force that Jefferson put into
words. ^°^
America can recapture the revolutionary spirit which
is her heritage, and can regain the initiative in the tech-
nological war. The merger of systems analysis and strategic
analysis; the empirical and the intuitive, is an important
step in that direction..
^
° Merry Pournelle, Introduction to David Drake,
Hammer s Slammers . Op. Cit . p. vi
.
^ °
^Archibald Macleish, "The Conquest of America", The
Atlantic . March, 1980.
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V. CONCLUSION
The technological war in which the United States has
been engaged since World War II has placed burdens unprece-
dented in their complexity and consequence upon the national
defense effort. Ways must be found to increase the compe-
'
tence of personnel at all levels. Administratively the
government must make improvements in the process of
decision-making. Political as well as physical survival may
well hinge on the speed and efficiency with which technology
is converted into weapons and weapons systems; and the speed
and efficiency with which policy, strategic, and tactical
planning is developed to employ them. Men and material are
still important, but economic and political factors have
assumed critical importance. In order to continue to meet
the threat the United States will be increasingly dependent
upon its intellectual, scientific, and economic resources.
Not only must these resources be readily available, but they
must be competent and reliable. One of the requirements of
the technological war is strategic analysis. It is the
synthesis of the quantitative with the intuitive.
There have been three basic phases of intellectual
development in the American defense effort this century.
The first, from 1920 to 1945, was the historical/ legal
descriptive. This period was stimulated by education and
strong policy-makers. It was characterized by isolationism
and the beginnings of American international diplomacy and
the growth of international law. From 1945 to 1975 was the
behavioral period. The behavioral period was characterized
by the rationalization process, the advent of systems anal-
ysis, and the application of empirical methods to the
process of decision-making. Scientists were employed to
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apply reason and the scientific method to policy-making.
With McNamara as Secretary of Defense, "the best and
brightest syndrome" drove the defense effort. This period
reached its climax in Vietnam; with the realization that it
was not the be-all end-all as previously advertised.
One of the major shortfalls of the empirical methods is
the lack of a long haul concept. Planning takes place only
in relation to individual decisions, usually driven by budg-
etary considerations. Another problem is the tendency of
empirical evidence to drive non-quant ifyable evidence from
the decision-making process; "If it doesn't fit the balance
sheet, it can't be important." The most recent phase is
characterized by a reaction against the excesses of behav-
ioralism experienced in the recent past, and a realization
of the need for synthesis. The rational paradigm began to
develop during the first phase, reached its zenith in the
second, and has begun its demise in the third. However, it
cannot be allowed to fall by the wayside; the methodology
and concepts provided are too valuable.
A. PRACTITIONERS AS ARTISTS
While no-one can refute the value of empirical research
and the scientific method, recent history has forced us to
admit the limits of rational discourse. While the benefits
that have accrued are visible everywhere, we have been
forced to expand our definition of empiricism. The problem
has been and continues to be the tendency to forget that we
exist in a pluralistic universe requiring a multidimensional
mindset. Theories, as William James once said, "are instru-
ments not answers to enigmas in which we can rest." The
issue therefore, is to construct multidimensional intellec-
tual instruments positioning the rational and intuitive in a
mode useful to the practitioner. The goals and objectives
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must be identified first, then empirical research can be
employed in the search for alternative solutions. Even in
that mode empirical research alone cannot do the entire job;
hence enter the intuitive, the speculative, the creative.
The defense of the United States is too important a
problem to not utilize all the assets available for the job.
A synthesis of the rational paradigm with radical empiricism
is necessary. Any variable which might be important, no
matter what the source, must be admitted to the planning
equation. There is no place for any one group to have the
hubris to believe that they alone can provide all the
answers. Imagination is central to the concept of strategic
analysis in the American context.
In the search for viable alternative policy solutions,
speculative, imaginative, and intuitive approaches must be
examined in addition to the quantifyable evidence. This
approach could yield a synergistic effect, producing a
result greater than the sum of its parts. The synthesis of
the empirical and intuitive methods can be the guiding force
which the American defense effort currently lacks.
B. ADMINISTRATION, MOTIVATION AND REALITY
Charles Evans Hughes once observed, "all plans for
betterment must pass the crucial test of administration."
So it is with the development of a functional and profes-
sional cadre of strategic planners in the United States
Navy . -^ ° ^ We know the intellectual and attitudinal prepara-
tions; we have the personnel and other resources to develop
the capability. We now need a change in the personnel poli-
cies of the Navy and other military services so that
talented individuals may be motivated and developed within a
^°^For additional information, see Charles E. Milsted,
Jr. A Corps of Naval Strategl^st s . (Monterey, Ca., Naval
Post-Graduate~School , June , 1983
)
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career pattern that is professionally viable.
It is worth pointing out again that a single man or a
few people with a good idea, who have contact with one
senior decision-maRer , can gain adoption of a plan with
which ninety percent of the other decision-makers and
advisors disagree. ^°^
If strategic analysis is to be utilized to combat the
pitfalls of systems analysis, and if these people with a
truly strategic view are to implement the synthesis of the
empirical and the intuitive, significant change must be made
in the way we organize the nation's vital personnel assets.
Neither the Navy or the nation can continue to approach the
complexities of policy decisions on an ad-hoc basis.
To become the planner that we envision requires time.
One must be able to intellectually link not only alternative
courses but also entire disciplines and methodologies. That
these persons exist and must be gleaned from the established
personnel system is recognized.
There are many embryo good naval planners in the fleet
today... They read a lot. They are extremely observant
and curious, rarely opinionated, and always learning
about things outside their assigned specialty . ^ °
^
The fact that good potential planners exist is true, not
only for the Navy, but across the spectrum of the United
States Military Officer Corps. The problem is that there is
no premium put upon these talents . In order for these offi-
cers to maintain the positive attributes of imagination and
curiosity they must persevere a system which demands other
abilities
.




"Great Operators, Good Administrators, Lousy
Planners.", P. 78.
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C. CHANGE AND COMPLEXITY
The speed of change and the increasing complexity of the
threat, along with increased economic, political and
temporal costs of weapons and strategies has fundamentally
pointed out that planning is the preface of management
.
Planning, especially in the defense sector, requires intel-
lectual breadth and an administrative reformation.
While the task may seem formidable, one must remember
that the American military is a most adaptable social insti-
tution. When called upon to respond to other great social
changes in American society, the military not only
responded, but in several instances actually led the way.
As it becomes increasingly clear that planning in terms of
the modern requirements is a vital necessity, there is
reason to hope that the military will respond in a manner
appropriate to its commitment in the defense of a changing
pluralistic democracy which Jefferson once described as the
last great hope of mankind.
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